USA Did Not Back Milinda Moragoda’s Father for Law of the Sea Conference Presidency in 1981: Is Pathfinder’s Pro-American Alignment Worth It?
By ColomboFire Political Desk
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has always required a delicate balance between national sovereignty, economic necessity and the competing interests of powerful nations. Yet when influential policy institutes increasingly appear to echo Washington’s strategic priorities, an important question deserves to be asked: are they promoting Sri Lanka’s national interests, or helping to advance the geopolitical agenda of a foreign power?
That question is particularly relevant to the Pathfinder Foundation, associated with former minister Milinda Moragoda, and its engagement with American foreign policy perspectives. When think tanks organise discussions around US strategic priorities, invite former diplomatic officials and promote closer engagement with Washington, the public has every right to ask what Sri Lanka stands to gain.
The issue is not whether Sri Lanka should maintain good relations with the United States. It absolutely should. The issue is whether alignment with Washington should be treated as an objective in itself, regardless of the consequences for Sri Lanka’s independent foreign policy.
An episode from 1981 provides a striking historical point of comparison.
The 1981 contest: Tommy Koh versus Christopher Pinto
Declassified American diplomatic records concerning the Law of the Sea negotiations offer a revealing account of Washington’s position on the selection of a new president of the conference.
The document, preserved in the US Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States historical series, records the American administration’s internal deliberations over two principal candidates: Singapore’s Tommy Koh and Sri Lanka’s Christopher Pinto.
The distinction matters because Christopher Pinto was a distinguished Sri Lankan diplomat and an internationally respected legal figure. He was being considered for the presidency of an important multilateral conference dealing with maritime law, ocean resources and the future international legal framework governing the seas.
According to the American record, Washington considered Pinto fair and impartial, and expected him to assess American positions without personal bias. However, the document also described his political philosophy as unequivocally Marxist.
The American administration ultimately reached a consensus in favour of Tommy Koh, Singapore’s representative. The reasoning recorded in the document included Singapore’s close relationship with the United States and Washington’s belief that those relations could prove useful in dealing with Koh as conference chairman.
This is an important historical detail. The United States did not simply select a candidate on the basis of professional competence or impartiality. Its strategic calculations and diplomatic relationships were also part of the decision.
The historical lesson is clear: powerful countries pursue their interests first. Sri Lanka must do the same.
The record does not establish that Washington opposed Christopher Pinto because of personal hostility towards his family, nor does it establish that the decision was directed against Milinda Moragoda. It documents an American assessment of candidates and a decision to support Tommy Koh.
That distinction is essential. Political criticism is strongest when it rests on documentary evidence rather than assumptions about personal motives.
Nevertheless, the episode raises a legitimate question about the limits of diplomatic friendship: when national interests diverge, how much weight should Sri Lanka attach to the preferences of Washington?
From Christopher Pinto to Milinda Moragoda: What has changed?
More than four decades later, Sri Lanka faces a different geopolitical landscape. The Cold War has given way to strategic competition between the United States and China, while India has emerged as an increasingly influential regional power. Sri Lanka’s location along major Indian Ocean shipping routes has made it an important consideration in the strategic calculations of all three countries.
Against this background, the activities of the Pathfinder Foundation deserve scrutiny. If a Sri Lankan think tank wishes to promote closer relations with Washington, it is entitled to do so. However, it must also demonstrate that its policy recommendations are grounded in Sri Lanka’s economic, security and diplomatic interests.
Milinda Moragoda has long been associated with discussions on foreign policy, economic diplomacy and Sri Lanka’s international relationships. The question is not whether he is entitled to advocate stronger American engagement. He is. The question is whether his approach sufficiently recognises that the United States will pursue its own strategic priorities, just as it did during the 1981 Law of the Sea negotiations.
Why should Sri Lanka assume that Washington’s priorities will always coincide with Colombo’s?
When the United States seeks cooperation on maritime security, regional defence, investment or strategic competition with China, Sri Lanka must assess every proposal according to its own merits. American support can bring genuine opportunities, but diplomatic engagement must not become a substitute for independent judgement.
Is the Pathfinder Foundation promoting Sri Lankan interests or Washington’s priorities?
When policy institutes organise events featuring former diplomats and geopolitical commentators, their contribution should be measured by the quality of their analysis, the diversity of their perspectives and their willingness to question powerful governments.
The participation of retired Foreign Secretary Bernard Gunatilleke in policy discussions, for example, should not be dismissed simply because he is a former official. Experience in diplomacy can be valuable. But past experience alone does not guarantee an accurate understanding of today's rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
The real test is whether the arguments presented withstand scrutiny.
Does the discussion adequately consider the consequences of US-China rivalry for Sri Lankan exports, debt restructuring, infrastructure investment and maritime security? Does it examine American policy inconsistencies as critically as it examines Chinese influence? Does it explain the risks Sri Lanka might face if it becomes too closely associated with one strategic camp?
And when researchers raise difficult questions about Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, do they receive substantive answers supported by evidence?
These are reasonable questions for any independent newspaper to ask. They are not personal attacks; they are essential tests of accountability.
Likewise, whether Milinda Moragoda is an American citizen is not the decisive issue. Nationality alone does not determine whether a person's political arguments serve a country's interests. What matters is the substance of the policies advocated, the evidence supporting them and the consequences for Sri Lanka.
The public deserves arguments, not labels.
Washington is not an automatic friend
The 1981 diplomatic record illustrates how Washington assessed the candidates for the Law of the Sea Conference presidency through the lens of American interests. Singapore's close relationship with the United States formed part of the reasoning behind the decision to support Tommy Koh.
This does not mean the decision was necessarily improper. Governments routinely evaluate diplomatic appointments according to their interests. Nor does the record prove that Washington deliberately sought to undermine Sri Lanka as a country.
But it does demonstrate why Sri Lankan policymakers must avoid confusing a friendly diplomatic relationship with an unconditional commitment to support Sri Lankan aspirations.
Consider the practical consequences today. Sri Lanka needs access to American markets, foreign investment, tourism, technology, educational opportunities and cooperation on maritime security. It also needs constructive relations with China, India, Japan, Europe, the Gulf states and other trading partners.
No responsible government should jeopardise those relationships merely to satisfy the strategic preferences of another country.
If Washington offers investment that creates employment, expands exports and transfers technology, Sri Lanka should welcome it. If Beijing offers commercially viable infrastructure, that proposal should be judged by the same standards. If New Delhi offers cooperation that strengthens regional connectivity and energy security, Colombo should examine that opportunity on its merits.
The standard must remain consistent: Sri Lanka first, evidence first, national interest first.
The danger of geopolitical cheerleading
There is a difference between diplomatic engagement and geopolitical cheerleading. The former involves negotiation, cooperation and the pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes. The latter risks treating the preferences of a powerful country as the starting point for every policy decision.
Sri Lanka has experienced the costs of economic mismanagement, excessive borrowing and strategic decisions that failed to deliver adequate public benefits. The country cannot afford another approach in which international prestige takes precedence over measurable economic results.
The public should therefore ask the Pathfinder Foundation to explain the practical benefits of its policy recommendations. What investments could they attract? How many jobs might be created? What export opportunities could emerge? How would Sri Lanka protect its independence when Washington and Beijing disagree over maritime security or regional strategy?
These are the questions that matter to ordinary Sri Lankans struggling with living costs, employment and the need for sustainable economic growth.
A think tank's credibility should rest on the strength of its research, not the proximity of its participants to influential diplomatic circles.
Sri Lanka must learn from history
Christopher Pinto's unsuccessful candidacy in 1981 should not be transformed into an allegation of personal wrongdoing against Milinda Moragoda or his family. The available American record does not support such a conclusion. Its importance lies elsewhere: it demonstrates that Washington's diplomatic choices were shaped partly by its assessment of strategic relationships.
That is precisely why Sri Lanka must develop a foreign policy based on informed independence rather than unquestioning loyalty to any external power.
The United States remains an important partner. There is no contradiction between maintaining close relations with Washington and challenging American positions when Sri Lankan interests require it. Indeed, a mature partnership should be able to withstand disagreement.
The same principle applies to every major power.
So, is it worth Milinda Moragoda and the Pathfinder Foundation placing such emphasis on America's geopolitical outlook? The answer depends on what that engagement delivers for Sri Lanka.
If it generates investment, improves trade access, strengthens maritime security and protects national sovereignty, it deserves serious consideration. If it merely reproduces Washington's strategic talking points without examining their implications for Colombo, the public is entitled to demand a more independent approach.
Sri Lanka does not need to choose between Washington and Beijing. It needs the confidence to negotiate with both.
The lesson of 1981 is not that America is Sri Lanka's enemy. It is that American foreign policy is designed to advance American interests. Sri Lanka's political leaders, diplomats and policy institutes must be equally determined to advance Sri Lankan interests.
That is the real test of strategic independence—and the standard by which the Pathfinder Foundation's contribution should ultimately be judged.