Pathfinder and Milinda Moragoda: Did a Private Sri Lankan Think Tank Act Like the Government?
Questions are being raised over how the Pathfinder Foundation became involved in drafting a “Code of Conduct” for the Indian Ocean—and whether its role was presented to India and other international actors as though it carried the authority of the Sri Lankan Government.
In January 2018, the Pathfinder Foundation, a Sri Lankan think tank associated with former Foreign Minister Milinda Moragoda, drafted a proposed Code of Conduct (CoC) for the Indian Ocean for submission to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The document was reportedly prepared at the behest of the Sri Lankan Government and was described as a non-binding framework intended to establish rules for regional cooperation.
But this raises a much larger diplomatic question: who exactly authorised the Pathfinder Foundation to speak on behalf of Sri Lanka in such a strategically sensitive area?
If a private think tank was acting merely as an organisation providing policy advice to the Sri Lankan Government, that would be one matter. If, however, it presented itself to foreign governments and international institutions as though it possessed governmental authority, that would raise serious questions about diplomatic protocol, institutional legitimacy and accountability.
How did a private organisation acquire the appearance of government authority?
Milinda Moragoda is a well-known former Sri Lankan politician and diplomat, while the Pathfinder Foundation is a policy-oriented think tank. Neither fact, by itself, gives a private organisation the legal authority to represent the Government of Sri Lanka.
The Indian Ocean is not an ordinary policy subject. It involves maritime security, freedom of navigation, fisheries, piracy, terrorism, trafficking, transnational crime and the strategic interests of India, China, the United States, European countries and numerous Indian Ocean states.
Therefore, any proposal described as a regional Code of Conduct inevitably carries diplomatic significance.
The central question is consequently not whether the Pathfinder Foundation was entitled to produce a policy paper. Clearly, think tanks can produce policy proposals.
The question is whether the document's origins, authority and relationship with the Sri Lankan Government were made sufficiently clear to every foreign government and international organisation involved.
If the Pathfinder Foundation was genuinely commissioned by the Sri Lankan Government, where was the formal governmental mandate? Which ministry authorised it? Which minister approved the final document? Was it subsequently adopted by the Cabinet or formally endorsed by the Government?
And if there was no such formal governmental endorsement, why would foreign officials regard the document as representing Sri Lanka?
India and the unusual diplomatic situation
The situation becomes particularly interesting because the proposed Code of Conduct was intended for the Indian Ocean Rim Association, an intergovernmental organisation whose members are sovereign states.
A private Sri Lankan organisation proposing a regional framework is perfectly legitimate as an exercise in intellectual diplomacy.
But a private proposal cannot automatically become a Government of Sri Lanka policy simply because the person behind the organisation has previously held senior government positions.
This distinction matters enormously in international diplomacy.
A former minister does not remain a government minister after leaving office. A private foundation does not become a government ministry because its chairman or senior officials have political connections.
If international officials were led to believe otherwise, the consequences could be embarrassing not only for the Pathfinder Foundation but also for Sri Lanka.
A Code of Conduct with significant weaknesses
There are also substantive questions about the proposed Code itself.
The draft reportedly sought to establish rules for cooperation in the Indian Ocean and called for greater information sharing among regional partners, the designation of single points of contact for maritime matters, and stronger communication and collaboration.
These are reasonable objectives.
However, critics have argued that the document did not adequately confront the complexity of maritime security in the Indian Ocean.
One major question concerns its geographical and strategic focus.
Why should Sri Lanka attempt to create an overarching framework for the Indian Ocean when existing arrangements already address particular maritime security problems, including piracy and armed robbery?
The document's treatment of substantive threats also appears limited.
Piracy, armed robbery against ships and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing receive specific attention. But other major threats—including trafficking, smuggling, transnational organised crime and maritime terrorism—appear to receive considerably less detailed treatment.
Simply identifying a problem is not the same as creating an effective mechanism to deal with it.
A serious regional Code of Conduct should establish not merely broad principles but also mechanisms for implementation, information exchange, coordination, responsibility and dispute management.
Did Milinda Moragoda become the “Government of Sri Lanka”?
This is where the political controversy begins.
Critics may reasonably ask whether Milinda Moragoda and the Pathfinder Foundation were operating as a policy think tank—or whether they were effectively presenting themselves as an alternative diplomatic channel for Sri Lanka.
The distinction is fundamental.
Sri Lanka has a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic missions, ambassadors and other officially designated institutions responsible for representing the state internationally.
If an organisation outside that formal structure was communicating with foreign governments about a major Indian Ocean initiative, the public deserves to know exactly what mandate it possessed.
Was Pathfinder acting under written instructions?
Was the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry involved?
Was the proposal approved by the Cabinet?
Was the final text officially adopted?
Was India informed that Pathfinder was acting only as a private policy organisation?
These are legitimate questions of transparency rather than personal attacks.
Did India mistake a think tank for the Sri Lankan Government?
The most extraordinary question is whether Indian officials fully understood the status of the organisation presenting the proposal.
If Indian officials knew that Pathfinder was merely a private think tank, there is little controversy. Think tanks routinely engage governments and international organisations.
But if the organisation's presentation created the impression that it possessed official Sri Lankan governmental authority, then the episode deserves much greater scrutiny.
It would raise the embarrassing possibility that a private organisation managed to operate within an intergovernmental diplomatic environment with an appearance of state authority.
That would not merely be an issue for Sri Lanka.
It would also raise questions for the Indian officials who received, considered or promoted the proposal.
International observers would naturally ask questions
Such an unusual arrangement would inevitably attract attention from diplomats and international policy officials from the United States, China and European countries, as well as officials working within the United Nations system.
The Indian Ocean is one of the world's most strategically contested maritime regions. Any organisation claiming to speak for Sri Lanka on regional maritime governance can expect its credentials and authority to be examined.
The basic diplomatic question is simple:
Was Pathfinder representing the Government of Sri Lanka, advising the Government of Sri Lanka, or simply presenting its own independent policy proposal?
There is a very large difference between those three roles.
The “April Fool” diplomacy question
The episode could even be described, metaphorically, as an “April Fool” moment in Indian Ocean diplomacy—not because the Code of Conduct itself was necessarily a joke, but because of the extraordinary possibility that a private organisation could appear to occupy the diplomatic space normally reserved for a sovereign government.
If that interpretation is wrong, Pathfinder and the relevant Sri Lankan authorities have a straightforward opportunity to clarify the matter.
They should publish the mandate under which the organisation prepared the document, identify the Sri Lankan governmental authority that commissioned it, and explain whether the final proposal was formally approved by the Government.
Until those questions are answered, the controversy remains.
The real issue is not whether Milinda Moragoda or the Pathfinder Foundation had the right to propose ideas for Indian Ocean cooperation.
They certainly had the right to propose them.
The real issue is whether a private Sri Lankan think tank was allowed to acquire the diplomatic appearance of the Government of Sri Lanka when dealing with India and other international actors.
If so, that would be an extraordinary example of private diplomacy crossing into the territory of state representation.
And if not, Colombo should make the distinction unmistakably clear.
After all, in international diplomacy, the most important question is not simply what a document says—it is who has the authority to speak for the state.