Justice on Trial: Can a Judge Summon Another Judge?
The recent case of AG agrees not to call High Court Judge as witness raises a fundamental question about the legal system: is a sitting judge immune from being forced to testify as a witness in another court?
The Attorney General gave a formal undertaking before the Court of Appeal that Avissawella High Court Judge Sahana Mapa Bandara would not be called as a witness before the Colombo High Court regarding judicial decisions made in the course of his official duties.
The Facts of the Case
Judge Mapa Bandara had been summoned to appear in a money laundering case being heard before Colombo High Court Judge Udesh Ranatunga. The purpose was to question him about a restraining order he had issued while serving as the District Judge of Nugegoda.
Judge Mapa Bandara was not included in the original list of witnesses attached to the indictment filed in February 2025. His name was only added later, in March 2026, on a supplementary witness list where he was still identified as "District Judge, Nugegoda."
Three senior legal professionals—President's Counsel Uditha Egalahewa, President's Counsel Farman Cassim, and Senior Counsel Sugath Caldera—promptly filed a writ petition before the Court of Appeal seeking urgent intervention.
The Legal Framework: A Judge's Immunity
The core legal principle invoked by the petitioners is judicial immunity. They contend that "judicial officers enjoy immunity in respect of their judicial acts" and that decisions made by judges can only be challenged through appellate or revisionary procedures.
This principle has deep roots. It is enshrined in Article 107 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which forms the cornerstone of the independence of the judiciary. The rationale is that if a judge could be hauled before another court to explain every decision, judicial independence would be severely compromised.
Sri Lankan common law also clearly states that judges are immune from liability for acts done in the exercise of their judicial functions. The Supreme Court affirmed this in the case of Peter Leo Fernando v. The Attorney General and Two Others (1985), where it was held that even a procedurally deficient judicial act performed in good faith is protected by judicial immunity.
Further reinforcing this, Article 116(2) of the Constitution makes it a criminal offence for any person to interfere with the judiciary. The provision criminalises any influence or intimidation of a judicial officer in the course of their duties.
This case is not about a judge avoiding accountability. The proper remedy for an aggrieved party is not to question the judge but to challenge the decision through established appellate or revisionary procedures.
The Outcome
The Court of Appeal, comprising President Rohantha Abeysuriya and Justice Priyantha K. Fernando, issued an interim order staying all proceedings connected to the summons and preventing further steps from being taken to compel the judge's appearance. On June 12, 2026, after hearing the matter, the Court decided to terminate the proceeding into the writ petition.
The Precedent: A Wall of Protection
The decision of the Court of Appeal is significant. It sends a clear message that while no one is above the law, the unique constitutional role of the judiciary demands special protections. It reaffirms that the correct legal mechanism to challenge a judicial order is to follow the appeals process—not to summon the judge who issued it.
If such a summons were allowed, it could have a chilling effect on judicial independence. A judge fearing that they might be called to account for a decision would be less likely to decide cases on their merits. This would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.
This case was resolved with a voluntary undertaking from the Attorney General, which means no binding precedent was set. But the Court of Appeal's willingness to act shows that compelling a judge to answer for their judicial acts as a witness would be a breach of a fundamental principle.
A Call for Dialogue
This case highlights the tension between accountability and independence. Is the current framework of judicial immunity too absolute? Does it shield potentially improper judicial conduct from scrutiny? Or is it an essential protection that must be defended at all costs?
As Sri Lanka navigates these questions, one thing is clear: the balance must be struck carefully. For now, the message from the Court of Appeal is that a judge's authority must be protected if justice is to remain truly independent.