$5.6 Million Advice: Was Sri Lanka Sold Expertise—or Silence?
By a Special Correspondent
When Sri Lanka formally announced that Lazard had been appointed as financial adviser and Clifford Chance LLP as legal adviser for the country’s sovereign debt restructuring, the press release was short, confident, and terminally incurious.
The fee—USD 5.6 million—was presented as a triumph of negotiation. The advisers, we were told, were selected by a high-level committee led by Treasury Secretary Mahinda Siriwardena and Central Bank Governor Dr Nandalal Weerasinghe. The Cabinet, chaired by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, had approved the decision. End of story.
But for a country whose taxpayers are now underwriting the most painful economic adjustment since independence, that explanation is woefully insufficient.
The real question is not who was appointed. Lazard and Clifford Chance are globally recognised firms. The real question is how, on what terms, with what accountability, and whether Sri Lanka obtained value for money—or merely global branding to shield political decisions from scrutiny.
Procurement Without Sunlight
Despite repeated parliamentary questions and civil society requests, the government has not disclosed:
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Whether an open international tender was called
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The number of firms invited or shortlisted
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The evaluation criteria used by the selection committee
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Competing fee proposals or scope comparisons
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The full contractual terms, including success fees, termination clauses, and liability caps
In any properly governed sovereign restructuring—particularly one funded entirely by public money—such information would ordinarily be placed before Parliament or, at minimum, released in redacted form.
Instead, Sri Lankans are asked to accept the appointments on trust, at a time when trust in fiscal governance is at its lowest ebb.
“Negotiated Fees” Is Not an Audit
The Central Bank Governor’s assurance that fees were “negotiated down” is not, by itself, evidence of value for money.
Negotiated down from what?
From whose benchmark?
Against which comparable restructurings?
Recent sovereign debt workouts—from Zambia to Ecuador—have involved lower advisory fees, clearer parliamentary oversight, and published mandates. Sri Lanka’s fee of USD 5.6 million may not be extraordinary in isolation, but extraordinary opacity makes it suspect.
Without disclosure of scope, Sri Lankan taxpayers cannot know whether they are paying for:
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A narrowly defined technical advisory role, or
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A broad mandate covering creditor engagement, litigation strategy, IMF coordination, and bondholder negotiations
Who Guards the Guards?
Another unresolved issue is conflict management.
Both Lazard and Clifford Chance routinely advise sovereign creditors, bondholders, and financial institutions in other jurisdictions. This is not unusual—but it requires robust disclosure and firewalls, especially when advising a distressed sovereign negotiating against global capital.
To date, the government has not publicly explained:
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What conflict checks were conducted
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Whether any waivers were granted
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Whether the advisers had prior exposure to Sri Lanka’s bond issuances
In a restructuring where every basis point matters, these are not academic concerns.
Advice or Indemnity?
Critics within Sri Lanka’s legal and economic community quietly ask a more uncomfortable question:
Were these advisers retained primarily for technical excellence, or for reputational indemnity?
In other words, were Lazard and Clifford Chance hired to optimise outcomes—or to ensure that future blame for debt decisions can be deflected to “international experts”?
If so, that would represent a profound misuse of public funds: outsourcing responsibility rather than accountability.
Why Parliament Was Bypassed
Perhaps the most troubling aspect is institutional.
A USD 5.6 million advisory contract, entered during an IMF programme, restructuring sovereign obligations exceeding USD 50 billion, was never debated in Parliament.
No white paper.
No committee scrutiny.
No post-appointment disclosure.
In a democracy already wounded by executive overreach, this silence is not procedural—it is political.
The Core Question Remains Unanswered
No serious observer disputes that Sri Lanka needed external advisers. The dispute is whether the process reflected good governance or emergency exceptionalism abused as cover.
Until the government publishes:
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The selection process
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The contract scope
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The fee structure
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The accountability mechanisms
one unavoidable question lingers:
Was this USD 5.6 million spent to restructure Sri Lanka’s debt—or to restructure public scrutiny out of the equation?
For a country demanding sacrifice from its citizens, opacity is not merely bad optics. It is bad economics—and worse democracy.