Sri Lanka’s Dilemma: How Foreign Research Vessels Are Turning the Island into a Geopolitical Triangle in the Indian Ocean
By ColomboWire Foreign Affairs Desk
Sri Lanka once prided itself on being a non-aligned island nation, strategically located yet diplomatically agile—small enough to avoid great power rivalry, but important enough to engage all sides. That comfort has long evaporated. Today, the country finds itself at the centre of an increasingly complex geopolitical triangle, shaped not by aircraft carriers or military bases alone, but by something seemingly innocuous: foreign research vessels.
The arrival—or even the proposed arrival—of research ships into Sri Lankan waters has become one of the most contentious foreign policy issues confronting the current National People’s Power (NPP) government led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. At the heart of the debate lies a simple but uncomfortable truth: in the modern Indian Ocean, “research” is rarely just research.
The SOP That Became a Strategic Battlefield
Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath’s recent announcement that Sri Lanka will finalise a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for handling foreign research vessels within the next two months may sound administrative. In reality, it is geopolitical dynamite.
Sri Lanka first appointed a committee last year to draft an SOP following the controversial arrival of Chinese research vessels—visits that triggered strong objections from India and the United States. Both countries cited potential threats to regional security, undersea infrastructure, and intelligence collection in the Indian Ocean.
Yet, despite months of deliberation, the SOP remains unfinished.
“It is still in the process,” Minister Herath told reporters at a media briefing. “Within two months, we will complete it.”
That delay itself tells a story. The SOP is not merely about port clearances, maritime law, or scientific transparency. It is about who gets to decide what happens in Sri Lanka’s waters—and whether Sri Lanka is truly sovereign in making that decision.
The Moratorium That Solved Nothing
In December 2023, under intense diplomatic pressure, the previous government led by Ranil Wickremesinghe imposed a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels. The decision was framed as a cooling-off period, a way to reassess policy amid rising tensions.
But the moratorium, which lapsed in January last year, solved nothing. Instead, it postponed hard choices and deepened uncertainty.
Analysts argue that indecisiveness since the moratorium expired has left Sri Lanka vulnerable—caught between competing powers, each interpreting Colombo’s silence to suit its own strategic narrative.
India and the United States—both members of the QUAD—view Chinese research vessels as dual-use platforms capable of mapping seabeds, monitoring submarine routes, and gathering signals intelligence. Beijing, for its part, insists its vessels conduct legitimate scientific research in international and host-nation waters with consent.
Sri Lanka, meanwhile, is left managing the fallout.
Why Research Vessels Matter More Than Warships
To the untrained eye, a research vessel appears harmless compared to a destroyer or submarine. Yet modern maritime research ships are often more strategically valuable than overt military assets.
They are equipped with advanced sonar, underwater drones, seabed mapping tools, and surveillance technologies capable of identifying undersea cables, pipelines, and naval routes. In an era where data is power, the seabed has become the new strategic frontier.
Sri Lanka sits astride some of the busiest sea lanes in the world, near critical undersea communication cables and energy routes. Allowing any foreign power unrestricted access to study these waters carries long-term implications.
This is precisely why India is anxious.
India’s Expanding Maritime Doctrine—and Sri Lanka’s Unease
India has, over the past decade, aggressively expanded its maritime footprint. From the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to Minicoy, from coastal radar chains to naval logistics agreements, New Delhi’s Indian Ocean doctrine is no longer subtle.
Within this framework, Sri Lanka is viewed less as a neutral neighbour and more as a strategic buffer.
Indian officials rarely state it openly, but the message conveyed to Colombo is clear: Sri Lanka should not allow activities in its waters that India perceives as hostile to its security.
This has translated, in practice, into expectations—sometimes demands—that Sri Lanka inform India, or even seek tacit approval, before permitting foreign research vessels, particularly Chinese ones.
Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has publicly rejected this notion.
Sri Lanka, he said last year, does not need to seek India’s approval or inform the neighbour about visits of foreign vessels. However, government officials privately acknowledge that previous administrations often maintained such practices informally to preserve goodwill with New Delhi.
That informal deference is now under strain.
China’s Calculated Engagement
China’s interest in Sri Lankan waters is not new. From port investments to maritime cooperation, Beijing has steadily deepened its engagement with the island.
Sri Lanka and China have agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on maritime cooperation, even as Indian concerns remain unresolved. Beijing insists its activities are transparent, legal, and cooperative. Critics counter that China’s research vessels are an extension of its broader naval strategy in the Indian Ocean.
The problem for Sri Lanka is not China alone—but the perception that accommodating Beijing automatically antagonises New Delhi and Washington.
The NPP Government’s Balancing Act
The NPP government inherited this dilemma but has attempted to recalibrate policy.
In January 2025, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s cabinet appointed a new committee to review the existing SOP and draft a revised framework governing all foreign research vessels, regardless of origin.
Foreign Minister Herath, who leads the committee, has emphasised fairness and uniformity.
The stated aim is to establish clear criteria applicable to all countries—China, India, the United States, and others—thereby removing accusations of bias or geopolitical alignment.
This is easier said than done.
The QUAD Factor and Strategic Pressure
The pressure from India and the United States intensified after two Chinese research vessels visited Sri Lanka within a 14-month period. For QUAD strategists, these visits were not isolated events but part of a pattern.
Washington’s concern extends beyond Sri Lanka. It views the Indian Ocean as a critical theatre in its strategic competition with China. Sri Lanka’s ports, waters, and policies are therefore scrutinised through a wider Indo-Pacific lens.
In this context, even a technically sound SOP may not satisfy all parties.
Defence MOUs and Ambiguity
Complicating matters further is the Defence Cooperation MOU Sri Lanka signed in April last year, which states that Sri Lanka and India will exchange information in maritime and other domains “on mutual consent”.
The document lacks specificity, leaving room for interpretation—and pressure.
Does “information exchange” imply prior notification? Does “mutual consent” create an expectation of consultation? The ambiguity itself is strategic, allowing stronger partners to nudge weaker ones.
Sovereignty Versus Survival
At its core, Sri Lanka’s dilemma is about sovereignty versus survival.
Insisting on absolute sovereignty risks economic and diplomatic retaliation. Excessive accommodation risks eroding independence and setting informal precedents that are hard to reverse.
For a country emerging from economic crisis, dependent on external financing, and navigating IMF conditionalities, foreign policy choices are rarely cost-free.
Is Neutrality Still Possible?
Sri Lanka often invokes non-alignment, but critics argue that true neutrality in today’s Indian Ocean is an illusion.
The sea is crowded with competing interests, and silence is interpreted as alignment by default.
The NPP government’s attempt to codify rules through an SOP is, therefore, not merely administrative—it is a bid to reclaim agency.
What the SOP Must Address
For the SOP to be credible, analysts argue it must address several key issues:
-
Clear differentiation between scientific research and military-grade data collection
-
Mandatory disclosure of equipment and research objectives
-
Onboard Sri Lankan observers
-
Data-sharing protocols ensuring Sri Lanka retains access to findings
-
Uniform application irrespective of flag
Anything less will invite suspicion.
The Risk of Becoming a Theatre, Not an Actor
The greatest risk Sri Lanka faces is becoming a theatre of geopolitical competition rather than an actor with agency.
If decisions are seen as reactive—driven by pressure rather than principle—Sri Lanka will remain trapped in a cycle of moratoriums, committees, and diplomatic firefighting.
A Test of Strategic Maturity
Foreign research vessels have exposed Sri Lanka’s strategic vulnerability more starkly than any warship visit ever did.
The coming months, and the long-promised SOP, will test whether the NPP government can chart a path that is principled, transparent, and genuinely independent—or whether Sri Lanka will continue to drift into a triangular contest it did not choose but cannot escape.
In the Indian Ocean’s silent depths, the battle is not for territory alone, but for influence, data, and future leverage. Sri Lanka stands at the crossroads—its decisions today will shape not just maritime policy, but its place in the world order for decades to come.