Rare Earths, Sea Lanes and Visas: Why the US–China Competition Is Drifting Towards Sri Lanka
Colombo — Great-power competition has a habit of migrating. Once concentrated in trade, technology and tariffs, it is now moving beneath the sea—towards cobalt nodules, polymetallic deposits and under-mapped seabeds. In this shifting geography of power, the Indian Ocean is no longer peripheral. It is becoming central. And Sri Lanka, long treated as a strategic convenience rather than a strategic equal, is once again finding itself at the crossroads.
The latest signal coming from Washington. President Donald Trump’s renewed public emphasis on competing with China for critical minerals and exploration rights—particularly those tied to clean energy supply chains—has sharpened attention on regions previously considered secondary. The message is unambiguous: whoever controls rare earths, cobalt and lithium will shape the next phase of industrial power.
Sri Lanka, sitting astride the world’s busiest east–west shipping lanes and possessing one of the largest known cobalt-rich seabed zones within its maritime territory, is no longer invisible in this calculus.
From Land to Sea: The New Rare Earth Frontier
China’s dominance over rare earth processing—estimated at over 70 per cent of global capacity—has long troubled Western policymakers. Efforts to diversify supply away from China have traditionally focused on Africa, Latin America and Australia. Increasingly, however, attention is turning offshore.
The Indian Ocean, with its polymetallic nodules and cobalt-rich crusts, represents a new frontier. Sri Lanka’s extended continental shelf, recognised under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), places it in possession of seabed areas believed to contain commercially viable cobalt and other strategic minerals.
For Washington, this matters. For Beijing, it matters more.
China has already invested heavily in seabed mapping, port infrastructure and maritime research across the Indian Ocean. Western re-engagement, therefore, is not accidental. It is reactive.
Trade Courting, Strategic Silence
The US decision to maintain Sri Lanka’s preferential trade access with a relatively low tariff regime—around 5 per cent on certain exports—has been welcomed in Colombo as a sign of renewed engagement. Trade delegations, investment forums and diplomatic overtures have followed.
Yet there is a contradiction at the heart of this relationship.
While Sri Lanka is being courted as a strategic partner, its citizens continue to be treated as a migration risk. Visa regimes remain restrictive. Travel scrutiny has intensified. In Europe and the UK, asylum claims by Sri Lankans have triggered political backlash, leading to tougher entry requirements and longer processing times.
The implicit message is awkward: Sri Lanka’s resources and geography are welcome, but its people are not.
The Shipping Lanes Paradox
Few countries contribute as much to global commerce while receiving so little recognition. Over 60,000 ships pass near Sri Lanka annually, carrying energy, food, manufactured goods and raw materials between East Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
Every major power benefits:
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China depends on uninterrupted sea lanes for energy imports.
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The US Navy relies on freedom of navigation.
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Europe depends on stable maritime trade.
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India views the waters as its strategic backyard.
Sri Lanka provides the geography. Others extract the value.
Ports are used, waters are transited, airspace is crossed—often without friction, cost or constraint. Yet when a Sri Lankan academic, businessperson or student applies for a visa to travel to those same countries, they are often treated as a potential overstayer rather than a stakeholder in global stability.
Strategic Assets, Third-Class Treatment
This disconnect is becoming politically salient in Colombo.
Why, policymakers quietly ask, should Sri Lanka offer open access to its seabed resources, logistical hubs and maritime cooperation, while its citizens face increasingly punitive visa regimes?
The UK’s recent signals that Sri Lankan applicants will be subject to stricter scrutiny—citing asylum trends—have been particularly controversial. From Colombo’s perspective, the issue is not migration management per se, but asymmetry of respect.
Strategic partnership, Sri Lankan officials argue, should be reciprocal—not extractive.
China’s Alternative Offer
Beijing understands this psychology well. Chinese diplomacy in the Global South increasingly emphasises dignity, non-interference and mobility, even when the economic terms are opaque.
While China does not offer visa-free access on a large scale, it rarely conditions cooperation on governance narratives or migration anxieties. Infrastructure, exploration rights and research partnerships are framed as state-to-state arrangements, not moral judgments.
This contrast is not lost on Sri Lanka.
The Rare Earth Bargaining Chip
Sri Lanka’s cobalt-rich seabed is not merely a geological fact. It is a bargaining chip.
Exploration rights, environmental permits, research partnerships and extraction licenses can be sequenced, delayed or diversified. Colombo does not need to rush. Nor does it need to choose exclusively between Washington and Beijing.
What it can do—if it chooses—is redefine the terms of engagement.
That may include:
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Demanding technology transfer rather than raw extraction.
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Insisting on environmental safeguards.
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Linking strategic cooperation to improved people-to-people mobility.
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Using visa reciprocity as a diplomatic talking point, not a threat.
Visa Policy as Geopolitics
In the 21st century, visa regimes are no longer administrative footnotes. They are tools of soft power.
Countries that want access to strategic assets but deny mobility to partner populations risk undermining their own credibility. For Sri Lanka, the argument is straightforward: if the West wants to “embrace” Colombo as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific, it must treat Sri Lankans as participants, not risks.
This does not require open borders. It requires fairness, transparency and proportionality.
A Moment of Choice
Sri Lanka stands at a familiar juncture. Geography has once again made it important. Resources have once again attracted attention. Promises of partnership are once again being made.
What has changed is awareness.
Colombo understands now that strategic relevance is fleeting unless converted into durable advantage. Rare earths can be extracted once. Shipping lanes can be used forever. But sovereign dignity, once traded away, is difficult to reclaim.
If the US and its allies wish to counter China’s influence in the Indian Ocean, they will need more than trade preferences and naval cooperation. They will need to demonstrate that partnership extends beyond minerals and maps—to people.
Otherwise, Sri Lanka may reasonably ask: if we are treated as expendable in your visa queues, why should we be indispensable in your strategic plans?